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Abstract: This article examines in detail how John Maynard Keynes approached 
investing in the US stock market on behalf of his Cambridge College after the 1929 
Crash. We exploit the considerable archival material documenting his portfolio 
holdings, his correspondence with investment advisors and his two visits to the US in 
the 1930s. Whilst he followed his enthusiasm for common stocks, he was equally 
attracted to investing in preferred stocks. His US stock picks reflected his detailed 
analysis of company fundamentals and a pronounced value approach. Already in this 
period, therefore, it is possible to see the origins of some of the investment techniques 
adopted by professional investors in the latter half of the twentieth century.  
  
 2 
In 1925, when reviewing the study by E.L. Smith (1925), Keynes revealed his 
attraction to common stock investing. He challenged the conventional view that such 
stocks were too risky for general investors and wrote:  
 
“The results are striking, Mr. Smith finds in almost every case, not only when prices 
are rising, but also when they were falling, that common stocks have turned out best 
in the long run…. This actual experience in the United States over the past fifty years 
affords prima facie evidence that the prejudice of investors and investing institutions 
in favour of bonds as being ‘safe’ and against common stocks as having, even the best 
of them, a ‘speculative’ flavor, has led to a relative overvaluation of bonds and 
undervaluation of common stocks.”1 
 
The Smith study, entitled “Common Stocks as Long Term Investments”, provided the 
first quantitative evidence on the extra return to be gained from a diversified portfolio 
of common stocks compared to that on a portfolio of corporate bonds over the period 
1866-1922. At the time, institutional investor portfolios such as those of US university 
endowments were dominated by bonds, mortgages and real estate and had a very low 
weighting in common stocks (Goetzmann et al., 2010). Today, in contrast, such 
investors characterized by a long-term investment horizon have a strong bias towards 
equity and equity-like investments (Swensen, 2009).  
 
Prior research has shown that Keynes was an innovative investor. He was among the 
first to exploit the newly emerged forward exchange market when speculating in 
currencies for himself (Accominotti and Chambers, 2015). At King’s College, 
Cambridge, he made a substantial allocation to UK ordinary shares for the 
endowment, whilst other Oxbridge colleges stuck with bonds and property (Chambers 
and Dimson, 2013, Chambers Dimson and Foo, 2015). The subject of this article is to 
examine how he approached investing on Wall Street. To what extent did Keynes 
follow his own advice and invest in US common stocks? From where did his 
investment ideas spring? And how did he navigate his way through the troubled 
waters of Wall Street after 1929?  
                                                        
1 JM Keynes “ An American Study of Shares versus Bonds as permanent investments” The Nation and 
The Athenaeum May 2, 1925 p157 
 3 
We address these questions by exploiting the complete record of the transactions 
Keynes undertook when running the endowment of King’s College, Cambridge. He 
also traded US stocks for his personal portfolio.2 However, these records are not as 
easily understood as those of his college where he reported regularly on the 
endowment to the investment committee and the fellowship of King’s. Nonetheless, a 
comparison of the US stocks in his personal portfolio with those of King’s suggests 
that the two were run on similar lines and in large part held the same stocks. It is also 
worth stressing that Keynes appeared to take as much care with King’s money as he 
did with his own. 
 
His first foray into US common stocks for King’s was in April 1929, when he 
purchased 100 shares of Massey Harris at $51 only to sell them at a small loss in 
August. Whilst he made further purchases immediately after the crash in October, he 
soon sold in the months that followed suffering modest losses. He did not return in 
earnest to investing on Wall Street until 1931-32 and then continued his buying until 
the end of 1937. Stock lists, transaction sheets, correspondence and research reports 
from stockbrokers as well as archival material documenting his US visits allow us to 
document the evolution of his US investment portfolio. 
 
The findings of our study are threefold. First, notwithstanding the attractions of 
common stock investing, Keynes invested as much in preferred as he did in common 
stocks. Wall Street in the 1920s and 1930s offered a degree of investment choice we 
do not see today. In the second half of the twentieth century, preferred stocks have 
largely disappeared both from investor portfolios and corporate balance sheets. 
Second, Keynes placed great store in fundamental security analysis. He was an 
enthusiastic consumer of stock research and undertook meetings with policy-makers 
and the company managements of his stocks. As with his UK stocks, his US stock 
portfolio displayed some pronounced tilts and did not merely mimic the market. 
Hence, the core of his portfolio focused on Investment Trusts, Industrials and Public 
Utilities, and he largely avoided Banking and Finance and Railroads. Last, Keynes 
                                                        
2 Keynes gained a little experience trading US stocks for his own account prior to the 1930s. In 1911, 
US Steel common stock became his first US investment and he traded this actively for several years 
after that. In 1926-27 he invested in Kennecott Copper but this was his only US holding in a portfolio 
of twenty stocks with a weighting of around 4%.  
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employed a value approach to investing in US stocks. Of course, Keynes was not 
alone in pursuing such an approach. Most celebrated among his peers is Benjamin 
Graham, investor, Columbia Business School finance academic and author of the 
canonical “Security Analysis” (1934) and of a series of articles entitled “Is American 
Business Worth More Dead Than Alive?” published in 1932 by Forbes magazine. In 
the latter, Graham set out his thoughts on why the stock market values of many US 
corporations had fallen well below their liquidation values by 1932. Although the two 
men corresponded towards the end of Keynes’ life on currency issues, to the best of 
our knowledge, Keynes developed his investment philosophy without seemingly 
being aware of the approach of this fellow value investor.  
 
Much has been written about the 1929 Wall Street Crash and its aftermath.3 The prior 
literature tends to look at the aggregate market behavior swept along by successive 
waves of extreme optimism and then pessimism. In contrast, there have been few 
detailed studies of how investors behaved during this period of market turbulence. 
One important contribution of this article therefore is to start to fill this gap. In the 
process of doing so, we are able to detect the origins of some of the investment 
techniques adopted by institutional investors in the latter half of the twentieth century 
– fundamental security analysis and investor meetings with company management, 
economists and policy-makers. 
 
A second important contribution of this study is to make the connection between 
Keynes’ activities as an investor and his economic writings. Chapter 12 of The 
General Theory (Keynes, 1936) sets out Keynes’ views on the relationship between 
the stock market and the macro-economy. In many ways, this is an early treatise on 
behavioural finance. Here, the reader will find the “beauty contest” analogy 
explaining the mass psychology of the market; as well as the often-quoted sentence: 
“Worldly wisdom teaches us that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than 
to succeed unconventionally.” Both passages highlight the tendency to herding that 
can occur in stock markets, then and now, among individual and institutional 
investors alike. Such irrational behaviour can frustrate the more considered approach 
of the “long-term investor” looking to investment fundamentals for guidance in his 
                                                        
3 Klein (2001) offers a good summary of this extensive literature. 
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stock selection. It is in this same chapter that we also encounter his reference to the 
concept of “animal spirits” and to its influence on the decision-making of firms and 
investors. These are important observations which continue to inspire behavioral 
economists today (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009).  
 
The evolution of Keynes’ US investments 
 
Keynes wore many investment hats. As well as investing his own money and that of his 
family and friends, Keynes also advised his college, two insurance companies, Eton 
School, and a London-listed closed end fund among others. Having become a fellow of 
King’s in 1909, he subsequently became first bursar in 1921 and managed the college 
endowment fund continuously until his death in 1946. This role was closest to his heart 
and he used it to make substantial investments in the US during the 1930s.  
 
King’s was one of eighteen Cambridge colleges with their own endowments at this time 
and the third wealthiest. The University had its own endowment and Keynes played no 
formal role in managing these assets. The annual investment reports of the King’s 
College endowment, written by Keynes for the college fellowship, together with year-
end lists of security holdings and transactions sheets, are kept in the King’s College 
Archives. Like many of the older Oxbridge colleges, King’s had been a large real estate 
owner since its foundation and this asset class still dominated the endowment when 
Keynes took charge. As bursar, Keynes reported on the securities in the portfolio 
separately from the real estate holdings and in considerably more detail. Real estate 
valuations based on market prices were not undertaken during his time. Consequently, 
we are only able to estimate a market value with any degree of accuracy for the 
securities in the endowment. The value of all securities held by the College endowment 
grew from GBP 285,000 in August 1921 to GBP 1,252,000 in August 1946 at market 
prices (unadjusted for inflation) through a combination of investment performance and 
cash inflows.4  
                                                        
4 The first market valuations of property were not carried out until the early 1960s. Based on a very rough 
guess of its market value in 1919, real estate accounted for approximately 80% of the King’s endowment 
when Keynes took up the reins. By 1946, this allocation had dropped to around 50% through both Keynes’ 
policy of property disposals and the strong performance of the stock-laden Discretionary Fund. See 
Chambers Dimson and Foo (2014) 
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Within the overall security portfolio, Keynes managed the so-called “Discretionary 
Portfolio”. It is this fund which he deemed was free from the restrictions of the UK’s 
Trustee Acts and where he had full discretion to invest heavily in UK equities 
beginning in the 1920s (Chambers, Dimson and Foo, 2015). The benefit of this decision 
is illustrated by the superior performance of the Discretionary Portfolio with its heavy 
allocation to stocks in comparison with the Restricted Portfolio limited to fixed income 
investments (Chambers Dimson and Foo, 2013). Over the twenty-five years during 
which Keynes was responsible for the endowment the average annual total returns on 
the Discretionary Fund, the Restricted Fund, the UK stock market and the UK 
government bonds were 16.0%, 6.8%, 10.4%  and, 7.1% respectively.  
 
Keynes’ allocation to US stocks within the Discretionary Fund averaged 33% through 
the 1930s reaching a maximum of 50% in 1939. Shortly thereafter, in January and 
April 1941, the UK Treasury requisitioned close to three-quarters of his US stocks by 
value in order to boost its US dollar reserves. Hence, Keynes made a substantial 
allocation to the US market within the Discretionary Fund and was rewarded with 
strong performance, albeit not quite as good as if he had left his portfolio invested 
entirely at home. The Fund’s overall return was 16.5% between September 1930 and 
August 1946, the period during which he invested in the US. Whilst his UK stocks 
performed about 1% better than this figure, his US stocks returned a little over 1% 
less than the overall fund return. Part of this difference was attributable to the 
depreciation in the US dollar against sterling over this period. 
 
Having dipped a toe into the stock market in 1929, he withdrew it in the months that 
followed and only returned in 1932-33, buying in greater amounts in 1934, 1935 and 
1936. Shiller (1981 p422, 2000 p 186) and Kabiri (2015 p 180-181) have furnished 
evidence suggesting that the market was considerably undervalued by the summer of 
1932. Contemporary accounts such as those of Graham (1932) also reflected such 
beliefs. Keynes seems to have shared this opinion and, more importantly, acted on it.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
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The detailed security transaction sheets enable us to trace Keynes’ net purchases 
(sales) of US securities quarter by quarter on behalf of his college and compare them 
to the movements in the US stock market (Figure 1). The bars describe Keynes’ 
quarterly net purchases and sales from 1929 to 1946. The line depicts the US market 
index described by the Cowles Index.5 The figure makes it apparent that Keynes 
began to invest when the market was at a low point in 1932-34. The sharp fall in Wall 
Street in 1937-38 appears to have caught him somewhat unawares. Despite some 
turnover of the portfolio, in the main, he stuck to his stock positions. In general, this 
pattern in his trading in the 1930s displays a tendency to a contrarian approach. 
Subsequently, the two occasions when he was forced to sell stock by the UK Treasury 
in 1941 visibly stand out. Thereafter, Keynes held his remaining investments and was 
largely inactive. 
 
We valued all Keynes’ US securities at market prices by sourcing common stock prices 
and dividends from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and hand-
collecting preferred stock prices from the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. 
Dividends and arrears for preferred stocks were collected from Moody’s Manual of 
Investments. All prices are end-of-month closing mid-market prices, and in the absence 
of a bid-ask quotations, the average of the daily high and low is taken. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Table 1 summarizes the total value of the US securities held by King’s, the number of 
stocks held, and the percentage weighting by type of security and by sector for each 
financial year ended August, from 1930, the first year end for which US investments 
were reported, up to 1946, the year of Keynes death. His number of US security 
holdings peaked at 45 in August 1939 and the market value of his US holdings 
reached close to USD 800,000 in August 1936. 
                                                        
5  See Shiller’s web site www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls. The Cowles Commission for 
research in Economics published a monograph in 1938 on indexes for US common stocks. The full 
series covers 1871-1937. Data from 1917 are taken from the “Standard Statistics weekly indices” and 
represent 90 % of all common stocks listed on the NYSE. We use the P-1 series (ALL STOCKS). This 
value-weighted index has been used by Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2006).  See Schwert (1990) for 
further discussion. 
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Keynes’ US Stock Picks 
  
What kind of stocks did Keynes favor? We first look at the types of securities and the 
sectors he invested in and then consider whether he preferred “value” or “growth” 
stocks and small or large capitalization stocks. 
 
Given his self-declared enthusiasm for common stocks, perhaps the most surprising 
finding in Table 1 is the fact that the average allocation to preferred stocks (44%) was 
very similar to that of common stocks (42%) across the whole period 1930-46. He 
began in 1935 to build large positions in Associated Dry Goods 2nd preferred stock 
and subsequently in Chicago Pneumatic Tool 3% cumulative convertible preferred 
stock. However, it was in the Public Utilities sector in particular that he favored 
preferred stocks including Electric Power and Light (EPL) 6% preferred stock, EPL 
7% preferred stock and United Gas 7% preferred stock. In so doing he avoided EPL 
common stock entirely and only purchased United Gas common stock in 1939.  
 
Keynes’ correspondence with his US advisers regarding these firms helps us 
understand why he believed that these preferred stocks were undervalued relative to 
their common stock counterparts. He surmised that the potential return to preferred 
stocks in the early 1930s was twofold – a potential income gain from the resumption 
of dividend payments and a capital gain from a narrowing in their discount to par 
value. Other things being equal, preferred stocks being without voting rights and 
without any claim to the residual cash flows of a firm tend to trade like bonds. 
Furthermore, preferred stock dividends are paid before common stock dividends and 
provide a more secure income stream in uncertain times. Normally, therefore, one 
would expect such preferred stocks to trade like bonds somewhere near their par value, 
typically $100, in the absence of a sustained rise in the general level of interest rates. 
Yet, when Keynes initiated his positions in 1932-33, his preferred stocks traded on 
average at a 58% discount to par value.  
 
Such large discounts were explained by the difficulties firms had in paying preferred 
dividends in the aftermath of the 1929 Crash and with the onset of the Great 
Depression. The high level of corporate debt in real terms by the early 1930s (Kuvin, 
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1938) combined with declining corporate earnings meant that cash flows in many 
cases were insufficient to service preferred stock dividends which ranked below 
interest on debt. Consequently, concerns about the ability of firms to pay dividends 
weighed heavily on their preferred stock prices.  
 
Keynes was attracted to those preferred stocks where dividends were in arrears. EPL 
6%, EPL 7 % and United Gas 7% had arrears amounting to $17.50, $20.50 and 
$21.60 per share respectively when Keynes began investing in a substantial way in 
1935.6 In the former two cases, these amounts were approximately equivalent to the 
then prevailing stock price. His belief was that the market would come to realize that 
these dividend arrears would at some stage be paid and as a result their depressed 
prices would rally. This was what subsequently happened. By 1936, the average 
discount on Keynes’ preferred stocks had narrowed to 26% as their stock prices 
rallied back towards par.  
 
Turning to the sector breakdown of his US investments, it is clear that Keynes 
concentrated his US portfolio on three sectors: Investment Trusts, Industrials and 
Public Utilities.7 His average weighting in these sectors was 29%, 27% and 21% 
respectively (Table 1). Unfortunately, a lack of data on sector weights for the US 
stock market in this period makes it difficult to know how Keynes’ portfolio 
compared. However, the fact that King’s had very little invested in two important 
sectors, Banking and Finance and Railroads, suggests that, in all likelihood, Keynes 
constructed a portfolio substantially different compared to the overall market.  
  
There are two possible rationales for his favouring Investment Trusts. These trusts 
offer a diversified basket of stocks, which are likely to track a general recovery in the 
                                                        
6 Keynes’ investment in EPL 6% preferred and EPL 7% preferred from the early 1930s was also a 
“play” on United Gas. The two stocks were connected via a cross-holding resulting from a 1930 
restructuring by which EPL acquired various securities of United Gas including virtually the entire 2nd 
preferred stock issue. Keynes bought the United Gas 7% 1st preferred, which ranked ahead of the 2nd 
preferred in paying dividends. As the economic recovery continued and oil and gas prices rose from 
their trough in 1932 to a high in 1936, the probability of United Gas clearing the dividend arrears on its 
1st preferred stock and resuming payments on its 2nd preferred stock increased accordingly. Since 
almost all of the latter issue was held by EPL, this in turn would assist the cash flows of EPL and the 
payment of the dividend arrears on the 6% and 7% preferred also held by Keynes. Hence, he was 
attracted to all three stocks.  
7 We follow the sector classification in Moody’s Manuals.  
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stock market. Hence, with stock prices at low levels in 1932, they would have offered 
one straightforward way for Keynes to bet on a market resurgence. Furthermore, 
investment trust stock prices can diverge from the underlying value of their 
investments which also trade on the market. In other words, they can trade at either a 
premium or a discount to their net asset value. Delong and Shleifer (1991) 
documented the existence of substantial premiums during the late 1920s, followed by 
substantial discounts in some cases in the early 1930s.  Although some trusts traded at 
discounts from 1932 onwards, three of his investment trust core holdings – Tri-
continental Common, General American Investors Common and Prudential Investors 
Common – appeared to trade at a premium to NAV at those times when Keynes was 
an active buyer. The net asset values attributable to common stock holders after 
deducting prior claims of these stocks had collapsed dramatically in the wake of the 
1929 Crash and were zero or close to zero. As Shleifer and Delong (1991, p. 683) 
have argued the existence of such premiums to NAV was due to the severe effects of 
the leverage of Investment trusts on the collapsing value of their underlying 
investments. Seen in this way, an investor in their common stock could potentially 
realise large gains as these shares acted as long dated call options on the general stock 
market. Furthermore, it may indeed have been difficult in a very depressed market 
with low volumes to buy stocks held within the investment trust if Keynes had wanted 
to purchase these directly. Accordingly, selecting investment trusts may have been a 
more cost effective way to access the underlying stocks.  
 
Keynes also had major holdings in the Industrials sector, for example, Homestake 
Mining. This gold mining investment averaged 10% of the total portfolio over the 8 
years he held it from 1933. Homestake illustrates well how Keynes was willing to 
make large bets on special situations that were highly peculiar to the US depression 
economy. The attraction of this gold mining firm stemmed from the benefits accruing 
from the revaluation of gold from $20.67 to $35 per troy ounce by order of the US 
Government in March 1933, a move made to facilitate the recapitalisation of the US 
banking system (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). His investment rationale was 
somewhat similar to that he employed when heavily overweighting South African 
gold mining shares in the 1930s in his UK portfolio on the back of the boost to 
revenues provided by the devaluation of the local currency since virtually all 
production was exported (Chambers and Dimson, 2013). 
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As we saw above when discussing preferred stocks, Keynes’ other major sector bet 
was Public Utilities. He saw that this sector offered rich opportunities for those 
willing to go to the trouble of undertaking fundamental security analysis. Quite apart 
from the opportunity provided by preferred stock dividend arrears, there existed the 
potential from the substantial oil and gas deposits and undiscovered reserves held by 
some firms. In addition, there was considerable uncertainty surrounding the impact of 
regulatory intervention in the shape of the 1935 Public Utilities Holding Company 
Act (Wheeler-Rayburn Act) and, in particular, whether these companies might be 
broken up and reveal their intrinsic value.  As mentioned above, in some cases, there 
were stock and bond cross-holdings among Public Utilities which added to the 
complexity of the analysis required to understand cash flows and security valuation. 
 
In summary, Keynes’ sector tilts in his US stock portfolio were considerable and his 
approach appears consistent with the one he took towards his UK stock portfolio. He 
largely avoided the same two sectors, Banks and Railroads, and had a substantial 
overweight allocation to the Mining sector compared to the market. It is also worth 
considering whether Keynes’ US sector bets diversified his UK sector bets or not. 
Clearly, the absence of Banks and Railroads in both markets did not. Otherwise, the 
UK stock portfolio had very little if anything in Investment Trusts and Utilities in 
contrast to the US portfolio. Furthermore, he had only a comparatively modest 
investment in mining stocks despite Homestake and Climax Molybdenum being two 
of his core holdings. Whereas in the UK portfolio, Keynes had a very substantial 
weighting in South African gold mines. The only real overlap was in Industrials. Here 
he did make direct comparisons regarding the valuation of Austin Motors, his largest 
UK holding, and General Motors where he had only modest positions. Using the 
valuation measure of market capitalization per automobile produced, he believed 
Austin was undervalued by as much as two-thirds compared to General Motors 
(King’s Archives JMK/PC/1/221-2).  
 
Overall, it seems reasonable to conclude that in terms of sector exposures his US 
stocks diversified his UK stocks within the overall endowment to a large degree. In 
the remainder of this section, we examine other pronounced characteristics of Keynes’ 
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stock picks and whether he displayed a preference for large or small firms and for 
value or growth firms.  
 
The fact that the median stock he held was below the market capitalization of the 
average firm in the CRSP database indicates a slight tendency towards buying smaller 
stocks. Equally, however, he clearly also held some large capitalization stocks at 
certain times as indicated by the fact that approximately half of his stocks were larger 
than the market average and the other half below for most of the 1930s.  
 
 [Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Both today and in the 1930s, we can assess the extent to an investor follows a “value” 
style by comparing the book-to-market ratio of his stocks with the same ratio for the 
overall US stock market. The book-to-market ratio for a stock is the ratio of its book 
value, or its asset value as reported in the balance sheet, to its common stock market 
capitalization. Hence, the higher is the book-to-market ratio the higher is the asset 
value of a firm compared to its common stock valuation. Correspondingly, the same 
ratio for the overall stock market is defined as the aggregate book value divided by 
the aggregate market capitalization for all listed common stocks. Based on all firms 
with listed common stocks included in the CRSP database, the market book-to-market 
ratio averaged 1.31x over the period 1930-46.8 The valuation of the stock market 
reached a low in 1932 with a ratio of 2.82x and a high in 1936 with a ratio of 0.867x. 
For each stock Keynes held, we compute its book-to-market ratio relative to the ratio 
of the overall market at calendar year-end. A relative book-to-market ratio above 
(below) 100% therefore implies that a stock has a book-to-market ratio larger 
(smaller) than the market and would be classified as “value” (“growth”). 
 
Figure 2 plots the relative book-to-market ratio for the 25th percentile, median, and 
75th percentile of the US stocks in Keynes’ portfolio. Overall, there is a pronounced 
tilt towards high book-to-market stocks. The only years in which the median book-to-
market ratio among his stocks is below the market average are 1932 and 1945. In the 
                                                        
8 Data on book values are taken from French (2014) and on market capitalisation values from CRSP. 
Where data is missing we use the Moody’s Manuals. We exclude Investment Trusts. 
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intervening years, the relative book-to-market ratio of the 25th percentile stock is close 
to or above the 100% mark, implying that the majority of his stocks can be classified 
as value stocks. The evidence points towards Keynes adopting a pronounced value 
approach in selecting his US stocks, particularly between in the mid-thirties  when he 
appeared to seek out value stocks as the market recovery took hold, and again in 
1940-2.. 
 
In summary, we can see that Keynes’ US stock picks displayed distinct characteristics. 
He concentrated on three sectors of the market, on preferred stocks as much as 
common stocks and exhibited a value bias. The tilt of his portfolio towards value 
stocks is consistent with the approach he took to investing in UK stocks (Chambers 
and Dimson, 2013). In contrast, there is no evidence of the tilt towards smaller 
capitalization stocks that was present in his UK stock portfolio.  
 
 
How did Keynes pick his US stocks? 
 
The considerable correspondence between Keynes and his stockbrokers and 
investment advisers allows us to examine how Keynes went about picking his US 
stocks. There were three principle channels through which Keynes gathered 
information on US stocks. He made extensive use of stockbroker research. This he 
supplemented with extensive field visits to the US on two occasions in 1931 and again 
in 1934. Last, he employed his network of personal contacts to supplement his 
knowledge of the Wall Street scene. 
 
The overall impression left by a careful reading of Keynes’ correspondence with all 
these investment advisors is that he used outside advice to supplement his own 
deliberations on stocks. Ultimately, he made his own investment decisions rather than 
following stockbroker recommendations.  Keynes primarily relied on two 
stockbroking and investment advisory firms for sourcing research on and trading his 
US investments, Case Pomeroy, based in New York, and Buckmaster & Moore, based 
in London. To a lesser extent, he also used two other New York firms, Lazard Freres 
and Seligman and Co., and another London stockbroker, Lawrence, Keen & Gardner.  
 
 14 
Keynes had a close relationship over many years with several partners at Buckmaster 
and Moore who handled the vast majority of his UK stockbroking requirements. Most 
of his US trades were also conducted through Buckmaster and Moore, who charged 
UK brokerage commission in addition to US commission and cabling expenses.9  The 
London stockbroker provided Keynes with longer research notes as well as two-page 
company reports. In some cases, they would source research notes from other US 
investment firms on Wall Street and pass them on to Keynes. Most often, the flow of 
research reports from Buckmaster and Moore appears to have been in response to an 
idea Keynes had on a particular stock or sector. One such example is Keynes’s 
enquiry regarding Railroad stocks in June 1938. Following a request from Keynes, 
Buckmaster and Moore sent a telegram to their US research contact as follows:10 
 
“We (B&M) familiar with position Baltimore and Ohio, but have client interested 
depressed railroad bonds as long term speculation stop please mail your opinion 
relative attractions Baltimore Ohio Nickel Plate Illinois Central Southern Pacific 
bonds current prices stop particularly interested outlook freight, financial position, 
extent maintenance expenditure whether bonds held banks and savings banks and 
other factors you consider relevant stop indicate issues you prefer and whether junior 
mortgage issues better unsecured loans”. 
 
Buckmaster and Moore provided Keynes with a four-page letter analyzing the various 
bonds and recommending ten railroad bonds on the basis of their high yields and their 
ability to cover debt interest comfortably.11 Keynes acted on this information and 
initiated core holdings in two stocks - Baltimore and Ohio and New York, Chicago 
and St Louis. Other examples of research provided by Buckmaster and Moore are 
detailed notes on the performance of investment trusts in 1938 and on Keynes’ major 
core holdings, Electric Power and Light, United Gas, and Climax Molybdenum in 
1939.12 
 
                                                        
9  BM/3/162 
10 SE/2/7/83 
11 SE/2/7/92 
12 SE/2/7/167 
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Keynes was not satisfied in getting his information solely through a London based 
UK broker and also looked to investment advisory firms based in the US. Among 
them, Case-Pomeroy, a small Wall Street investment banking and stock-broking firm 
with extensive London contacts, stood pre-eminent. His primary personal contact at 
the firm was Walter Case. His relationship with Case developed over a decade until 
Case’s death in 1938 and was a close and amicable one.13  His firm furnished Keynes 
with US macroeconomic and financial market views as well as specific investment 
recommendations. 14   As a general rule, Case offered stock ideas in response to 
Keynes soliciting his opinions on specific stocks or sectors.15 There was in addition an 
informal reciprocal agreement whereby Keynes supplied Case with information on the 
monetary and economic developments in Europe.16  He also relied on Case when 
vetting other investment professionals. Approached by Warren Persons of the 
Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation in December 1930 about becoming a member of 
an information-sharing network, Keynes consulted with Case and rejected the offer 
upon concluding that he did not fully trust the merits of the endeavour.17 
 
Other than Walter Case, Keynes corresponded with Case Pomeroy’s main analyst, 
David. S. Roswell. Keynes regarded him as “an expert in long-range studies of the 
value of securities and intrinsic values of firms”.18 Their correspondence developed as 
Keynes moved towards investing in public utilities, a sector which Keynes believed 
required an experienced analyst capable of conducting detailed balance sheet analysis. 
Keynes asked him for advice on choosing between the common and preferred stock of 
the two public utility firms, United Gas and Electric Power and Light, which as 
discussed above became core holdings in his portfolio. 
 
The esteem in which he held Roswell was acknowledged in 1939 when, following the 
death of Case the previous year, Keynes duly signed up as a paying client of his new 
advisory firm, Roswell and Company. He also recommended Roswell to Prudential 
Insurance, a British insurance company where Keynes advised on investments, 
                                                        
13 Case travelled to England circa 1938 to discuss investments with Keynes, RFK/13/213-6. 
14 BM/3/157 
15 BM/3/162 
16 One such example is a letter to Case advising on UK exchange rate policy in 1933, BM/2/311. 
17 BM/2/57 
18 BM/3/157 
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extolling his ability in long range forecasting of stock values, especially in the Public 
Utilities sector.19 An example of the extensive analysis, which Roswell conducted for 
Keynes, is the North American Company. The 13-page long analysis of this large 
public utility holding company in 1938 involved a full assessment of the value 
underlying the common stock requiring a detailed understanding of a highly complex 
network of subsidiaries and cross holdings and their break-up. 20  Keynes was 
persuaded by Roswell’s analysis and this stock became a core holding in the King’s 
portfolio. 
 
In 1931 and again in 1934, Keynes undertook month-long fact-finding visits to the US. 
On his first visit in May and June, he was invited to speak at the “New School for 
Social Research” in New York by Professor Alvin Johnson. When corresponding with 
Johnson ahead of his trip, he stated that the reason for the visit was to “gather 
information and not impart it”.21 In fact, both visits proved important in helping him 
formulate his investment strategy and contributed to his adding to his US 
stockholdings in the months that followed.  
 
From archival records, we have documented the types of individuals with whom 
Keynes met. Table 2 provides the detail on the people Keynes met on both his trips 
with links to business, investment and economic policy-making. This analysis reveals 
a distinct change of emphasis in the people he met across the two visits. Among the 
28 meetings on his first trip, 9 were with bankers, 6 with investment advisers and 5 
with central bankers. He had only 3 meetings with industrialists, and one each with a 
government official and an economist. This preponderance of appointments with 
bankers and investment advisers in 1931 subsequently gave way to meetings with 
politicians and government officials in 1934. On this second trip, Keynes held 27 
meetings and met with politicians, government officials and industrialists on 811, 6, 
and 3 occasions respectively. In contrast, he met investment advisers and bankers on 
only three occasions. Half of the politicians he met were members of the Banking and 
Currency Committee. 
 
                                                        
19 BM/3/157 
20 BM/3/52 
21 AV/1/36  
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Such a contrast in his two visit schedules very likely reflected a shift in the type of 
investment-related information Keynes was looking for. In the summer of 1931, it is 
likely that his appetite for information on government policy and the nature and extent 
of any proposed intervention in the economy was much greater than three years later. 
By 1934, the economy, banking system and stock market had all begun to turn the 
corner. Accordingly, Keynes’ need for information on specific industries and 
individual corporations was relatively greater. 
 
His first trip left him initially in a somewhat pessimistic mood as to the prospects for 
the US economy, its banking system and the stock market. His views at the very end 
of this trip were neatly summarized in a letter he sent from Case Pomeroy’s offices in 
New York to Buckmaster and Moore on 22nd June 1931. In the letter, he stated that he 
saw “nothing attractive in US common stocks” and foresaw no “real recovery” in the 
economy. 22 He went on to state his belief that 10% of the reserve system banks, 
measured by assets, were insolvent. His worries included the high levels of “till 
money”, “(banks’)…desire for liquidity”, the pressuring of bank customers for loan 
repayments and the fear of bank runs even when a bank was solvent. The plight of the 
banks he blamed on their purchases of second grade corporate bonds, trading at steep 
but uncertain discounts to face value, as well as on their “inadequately secured” loans 
to farmers and to real estate firms. 
 
Despite his initial pessimism, his improved knowledge of the US investment scene 
and the contacts gained were important in giving him the necessary confidence to 
think about buying US stocks at a later date. A key indication of such confidence is 
revealed in a letter dated August 1932 requesting data and advice from Case-Pomeroy 
on the prospects for recovery in the US automobile industry.23 In September 1932, 
Keynes sent another letter to Walter Case in which he details his thoughts on the 
market having reached a low point and the improved prospects for a recovery.24 
Therein he reasoned that stocks and commodities had begun recovering from levels 
                                                        
22 AV/1/92 
23 BM/2/246 
24 BM/2/242-5 
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“that were too low even in relation to a slump” once they began to rise from the 
trough in June 1932. 25  He also expressed his belief that the USD 1 billion program of 
large-scale open market operations undertaken by the Federal Reserve in March 1932 
had halted the financial crisis, and that industrial output would recover in due course 
as a result of government spending and other interventions in the economy. His letter 
closed with the memorable phrase: “I should be a bull, but a scared bull - firm, but 
funky” in reference to his decision to start buying around even prior to the market low 
in the summer of 1932.26 
 
Keynes was a net buyer of US stocks in four out of the five quarters following the 
quarter ended December 1931 (Figure 1). He diversified his earlier purchases of 
investment trust stocks by seeking out value opportunities in both the common and 
preferred stocks of Industrial firms. Keynes again increased his US stock exposure 
after his second visit. Anticipating a continuing recovery, he immediately began 
investing large sums of money in such economically sensitive sectors as Public 
Utilities and, to a lesser extent, Industrials, a strategy he continued through to 1937.  
 
In addition to stock research reports and investment meetings, Keynes had an 
extensive network of personal contacts at his disposal. Prior research has shown that 
Keynes made use of his connections in the mining industry in selecting his UK core 
holdings (Chambers and Dimson, 2013). How important were these contacts in his 
selection of US core holdings? We define a core holding as any security held for a 
period of at least 5 years with a weighting greater than 1% of the total value of his US 
stocks. On this definition, there were 20 core stocks held for an average of over 9 
years and together accounted for an average of two-thirds of his US portfolio across 
the whole period 1931-46 peaking at 89% in 1941 (Table 3). Next, we define a 
“connection” as a director or officer of an investee company with whom Keynes has 
direct contact.27 Having gathered data on directors’ and officers’ names from the 
Moody's Manuals in 1930, we then match these names to Keynes’ list of contacts for 
which there is evidence from his correspondence of a meeting having taken place. The 
                                                        
25 BM/2/242 
26 The word “funky” in this context means that he was afraid and hence sweating. 
27 We also include directors of non-core holdings with whom Keynes was connected who were 
themselves connected to directors or officers of Keynes’ core holdings. 
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column headed “Contact” in Table 3 indicates whether or not Keynes had a 
connection at one of his US core holdings. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Among the 20 core holdings, Keynes had a connection at 11 of them. Looking at his 
three main investment trust holdings, Walter Case (Case Pomeroy) was on the board 
of Selected Industries. Frederick Strauss (Seligman and Co) was a director of Tri-
Continental, and Walter Kahn and Frank Altschul (Lazard Frères) were both directors 
at General American Investors. Keynes met with all of them in 1931. Keynes also met 
with directors and officers of Electric Power and Light (Frederick Strauss and S.Z. 
Mitchell) on his two visits and they. The latter two were also officers or directors of 
Commonwealth and Southern Corporation. Since United Gas was part owned by 
Electric Power and Light, the transfer of information about United Gas to directors at 
Electric Power and Light was highly likely.  
 
There is something of a pattern here. In the Investment Trust and Public Utility 
sectors his connections appear to have been important, whilst in Industrials, they were 
not. We can only speculate as to the reasons why this pattern exists. One possible 
explanation might lie in the relative complexity of analysing Public Utility stocks and 
Investment Trusts referred to above. The former had complicated holding structures 
and were subject to considerable regulatory uncertainty; and the key to understanding 
the latter, was, comprehending the underlying intrinsic asset values of their stock 
portfolios.  
 
 
How did Keynes’ US stocks do? 
 
For each of the US investments held by Keynes at the start of the calendar, we 
estimate the buy-and-hold total return, capital appreciation (depreciation) plus the 
dividend yield, over the following year. We then compute the total return on his US 
portfolio in a given year by averaging the buy-and-hold return on each security 
according to its weighting by the market value at the start of the year as a proportion 
of the total US portfolio. Whilst this method ignores the precise dates when he bought 
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and sold a stock within a given calendar year, it provides a reasonable approximation 
of his overall portfolio performance. 
 
Keynes’ buy-and-hold returns for each year ended December the period 1930-45 are 
summarized in Table 4. The total return, including dividends, on the US stock market 
is measured by the Cowles Index. Across the whole period, the average annual buy-
and-hold return on his US investments was 13.6% comfortably exceeding the average 
market return of 8.1% per annum. His US investments did better than the overall 
markets in the majority of the 16 years he ran the portfolio. Other than 1930-31 and 
1941-42 when he had relatively little money staked, his main period of 
underperformance was in 19367-38 when Wall Street entered a second bear market.  
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
The analysis in Table 4 allows us to examine the performance of his common versus 
preferred stocks and his core versus non-core holdings. The average annual return on 
his common stocks (+21.0%) slightly exceeded that on his preferred stocks (+17.8%). 
Second, his core holdings (+18.4%) performed considerably better than his non-core 
holdings (+7.3%). Here is further evidence of his stock picking skills in that those 
stocks in which Keynes invested the most were his best performers. 
 
Giving some consideration to risk, it is true that Keynes constructed a US stock 
portfolio which was more risky than the market. We saw above that he completely 
excluded certain sectors from his portfolio and adopted a pronounced tilt towards 
value stocks. Hence, it is no surprise to find that the volatility of his annual total 
returns was 37.2% compared to 27.9% for the market. However, King’s and Keynes 
were well-rewarded for taking this level of risk. The reward-to-risk ratio is measured 
by the excess return over the risk-free rate divided by the standard deviation of returns 
and is known as the Sharpe Ratio. A ratio of 0.36 on Keynes’ US stock portfolio and 
one of 0.47 for his common stocks alone comfortably exceeded the 0.29 ratio for the 
market. 
 
A final question that arises is how did Keynes’ US investment record compare to the 
others. A partial picture of Ben Graham’s performance has been uncovered. This 
Formatted: Highlight
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fragmentary evidence suggests that Graham outperformed the market from 1925-35 
recording a return of +6% per annum versus +3.8% for the Dow Jones Industrials 
index. 28 There is no data for the remaining years which overlapped with Keynes’ 
management of the King’s portfolio. Quite possibly there may have been any number 
of investment opportunities after the 1929 Crash for those investors with a strong 
nerve prepared to undertake detailed security analysis. However, at this point we do 
not know and the authors are not aware of any other study of the peformance of US 
investment funds in this same time period. 
 
 
Summary 
 
Keynes was but one investor among many trying to make sense of the turbulent 
market conditions on Wall Street in the late 1920s and 1930s. This study of Keynes’ 
US investment experience is only possible because of the detailed and extensive 
archival evidence which he left behind. As a result we can see his every investment 
move. The picture, which emerges from our analysis of Keynes’ investments in US 
stocks on behalf of his Cambridge ccollege gives a much-needed glimpse into how 
portfolio investment was practised in the wake of the greatest US stock market crash 
of the twentieth century. More research by business historians is needed in order to 
discover what other investors were doing. 
 
Despite the appeal of common stocks, he allocated almost as much money to 
preferred stocks. On the whole, these stocks did about as well as his common stocks 
and considerably better than the overall common stock index. Today, preferred stocks 
have disappeared from institutional portfolios, which are dominated by common 
stocks and bonds. Before the post-WW2 changes in taxation, which disadvantaged 
these stocks, they played an important role in investor portfolios and in corporate 
finance. The 1920s and 1930s therefore represented a period of transition on the road 
to the “cult of the equity” which prevailed in the decades towards the end of the 
twentieth century.  
                                                        
28 Irving Kahn and Robert D. Milne “Ben Graham: The Father of Financial Analysis” The Financial 
Analysts Research Foundation: Occasional paper no. 5 (1977), p.42-46. 
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He concentrated his portfolio on three sectors, Investment Trusts, Public Utilities, and 
Industrials and virtually ignored others, including Banking. Moreover, he displayed a 
liking for value stocks. Despite, to the best of our knowledge, never having discussed 
this topic with each other, both Keynes and Graham alighted on the same recipe for 
long-term investment success. His tilt toward value stocks and pronounced sector bets 
in the US portfolio, are consistent with how he also invested in UK stocks. 
 
We can see from how Keynes went about picking stocks some elements of the 
investment approach adopted by professional portfolio managers today. Keynes was 
an enthusiastic consumer of well-executed stockbroker research and sought out the 
best industry analysts he could find, Roswell at Case Pomeroy being a prime example. 
He was not generally interested in stockbroker recommendations on individual stock 
names but rather used their research capability to analyse the stocks and industries in 
which he was interested. Furthermore, he visited policy-makers and the management 
of some of his largest investments making key contacts, which enabled him 
subsequently to monitor his investments. Such company meetings, with policy-
makers and with management are, an important tool of modern-day portfolio 
managers. 
 
Last but not least, Keynes wrote authoritatively about the psychology of investors and 
the stock market in The General Theory (Keynes, 1936). The intriguing question 
concerns the process by which he came to acquire these insights. It would seem 
reasonable to conclude that they in part at least arose from his own investment 
experiences. In the 1930s, Keynes himself had become the “long-term investor” 
carefully sifting through the fundamentals and attempting to withstand the irrational 
behaviour of the herd. Our aim in this study together with the companion studies on his 
UK stock trading (Chambers and Dimson, 2013, and Chambers Dimson and Foo, 2015) 
is to make the important connection between his work as an economist and his 
experiences as an investor. 
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Table 1: US Security Holdings held by King’s College, Cambridge 1930-46 
 
No. of Holdings and Total Market Value are in respect of the US securities held by the college at each August financial year end. All percentage 
figures are based on the Total Market Value of US security holdings. Common and preferred stocks are classified into sectors according to Moody’s. 
Manuals. 
 
 
1930 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 
No of Holdings 2 4 16 12 37 41 39 33 43 45 37 20 22 23 22 23 19 
Total Mkt Value 
(USD’000) 9.9 17.6 97.3 110.9 248.1 495.7 789.8 701.6 557.1 532.2 433.9 139.7 102.7 241.3 288.8 317.5 290.2 
 % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % 
Common 61.1 100.0 72.4 57.3 42.9 28.5 36.6 46.8 39.7 45.0 35.1 28.6 29.0 22.6 21.8 34.8 37.7 
Preferred 38.9 0.0 4.2 26.3 51.3 65.8 60.1 52.5 56.1 51.1 59.0 50.2 51.0 41.0 43.9 32.1 35.0 
Bonds 0.0 0.0 23.4 16.4 5.8 5.7 3.3 0.7 4.2 3.9 5.9 21.2 20.1 36.4 34.3 33.1 27.3 
  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Banks & Finance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Investment Trusts 0.0 100.0 50.5 30.0 26.0 26.4 25.3 21.7 20.4 19.8 22.7 23.2 24.9 20.1 23.9 27.9 35.4 
Industrials 38.9 0.0 8.1 46.7 42.3 38.7 24.0 29.0 30.2 32.5 24.0 30.1 34.1 17.8 16.7 24.3 21.8 
Public Utilities 0.0 0.0 14.3 5.8 22.9 27.5 44.3 41.6 37.3 34.3 41.6 15.5 15.3 18.6 18.8 7.7 7.0 
Railroads 61.1 0.0 11.1 2.5 7.2 6.6 6.0 1.2 4.4 5.0 6.0 20.6 23.9 12.6 12.6 13.4 11.0 
Bonds 0.0 0.0 16.0 15.1 1.5 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.0 26.3 23.8 22.4 19.3 
  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: King’s College Archives and authors’ own calculations 
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Table 2:  Keynes’ Meetings on his trips to the US in 1931 and 1934 
 
Panel A: 1931 meetings 
 
NAME AFFILIATION 
Banker    
Benjamin Anderson  Chase National Bank  
Melvin Traylor First National Bank, Chicago 
George Davidson President, Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co 
George M Reynolds Continental Illinois Bank and Trust company 
Walter Lichtenstein  First National Bank of Chicago 
Jackson Reynolds  President, First National Bank 
Harold Stanley JP Morgan 
Russell Leffingwell JP Morgan 
Benjamin Anderson Chase National Bank  
Investment Advisor   
Albert Forsch Lazard Frères 
Lester Perrin Lazard Frères 
Walter Kahn Economist of Lazard Frères 
Alexander Sachs  Lehman Corp 
Frederick Strauss Seligman and Co 
Henry Breck  Seligman and Co 
Central Banker    
Leon Fraser Director, Bank for International Settlements 
W.R. Burgess Deputy Governor, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Dr. E A Goldenweiser Federal Reserve Board 
Dr. Adolf Miller Federal Reserve Board 
Governor McDougal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago  
Industrialist    
Dr H D Daikin Chemist and Inventor 
Orlando Weber President, Allied Chemical Corp 
Mr Owen D Young Rockefeller Foundation/Radio Corp America  
Government Official   
T.F.Woodlock Former Interstate Commerce Commissioner  
Economist   
L. Kuvin  National Industrial Conference Board 
Life Insurance Co.   
David F Houston  President of the Mutual Life Insurance company 
Other   
Paul Cravath New York corporate lawyer 
Charles P Howland Council on Foreign Relations; "Foreign Affairs" magazine 
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Panel B: 1934 meetings 
 
NAME AFFILIATION 
Politician  
 
Senator Duncan Fletcher  
(Democrat) Florida, Chairman banking and currency 
committee 
Senator Frederic Collin Wolcott 
(Republican) Connecticut, Member banking and currency 
and labour committees 
Senator Robert J Bulkley 
(Democrat) Ohio, Member banking and currency, joint 
author of the Federal Reserve Act with Carter Glass 
Senator Alva B Adams  
(Democrat) Colorado, Member banking and currency, 
mines and mining committees 
Senator Charles McNary 
(Republican) Oregon, Member commerce, agri. & 
forestry, manufactures, territories and insular affairs ctte. 
Senator John G Townsend  
(Republican) Delaware Member banking and currency, 
appropriations committees 
Francis Sayre  Asst. Secretary of State, in charge of economics questions 
Ogden L Mills Secretary of the Treasury (1933) 
Government Official 
 
Herbert Feis Economist for Dept. of State 
Louis Brandeis US Supreme Court 
Joseph B Eastman Interstate Commerce Commission  
Edward P Costigan US Senate 
Rexford G Tugwell Dept Agriculture 
Frances Perkins Dept of Labour 
Industrialist  
 
Alfred Sloan General Motors 
Walter Chrysler  Chrysler Corp 
Whitney Shephardson Council on Foreign Relations; United Fruit Co. 
Investment Advisor 
 
Frank Altschul  Lazard Frères 
Walter Case Case Pomeroy 
Academic 
 
Dean W. B. Donham Director: Harvard Graduate School of Business  
Economist 
 
Dr Wesley C Mitchell Director: National Bureau of Economic Research 
Banker 
 
Russell Leffingwell JP Morgan 
Other 
 
Allen Dulles Council on Foreign Relations (secretary)  
Walter Lipman Jounalist  
Dr John H Williams Council on Foreign Relations 
Hamilton Fish Armstrong 
Journalist “Foreign Affairs” magazine; Council on 
Foreign Relations 
John Foster Dulles Lawyer 
  
    Source: King’s College Archives
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Table 3: US Core Holdings held by King’s College, Cambridge 1931-45 
All figures are the percentage weighting of a security in the US portfolio valued at August year end. A core holding is defined as a security held for at least 5 
years with a weighting in the total portfolio greater than 1%. Contact refers to whether or not Keynes had a meeting with an officer or director of the 
company. 
SECURITY NAME TYPE CONTACT AVE. 1931 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 
Investment Trusts                                       
Atlas Corp Cmn N 3.4 
    
3.8 3.5 1.1 2.2 4.2 5.4 
      General American Investors Co. Inc. Cmn Y 7.8 28.1 7.0 
  
1.9 2.8 
 
4.4 5.2 5.2 
      Prudential Investors Cmn N 1.8 
 
4.4 
 
1.2 0.9 2.5 3.1 2.2 2.0 3.2 0.6 0.0 0.1 
   Selected Industries Inc. allot. Certs Cmn Y 16.3 29.3 22.8 20.4 10.5 7.3 7.3 
          Tri Continental Common Cmn Y 8.4 22.0 4.8 3.0 0.9 2.2 3.8 8.6 6.5 3.7 2.7 8.3 7.4 10.6 11.8 16.6 21.3 
US & Intl Securities Corp  5% 1st Pref Y 9.0 
     
2.2 3.5 4.5 4.5 5.1 15.8 17.5 9.3 12.0 11.0 13.6 
Industrials                                       
Associated Dry Goods  7% 2nd Pref Y 3.8 
    
3.5 2.9 3.0 2.6 2.1 1.5 7.5 6.3 3.6 3.4 3.8 4.7 
Carriers & General Corp Cmn N 3.0 
     
0.9 1.9 1.3 1.1 1.2 4.4 4.7 3.6 3.6 4.2 5.9 
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.  3% conv Pref N 6.4 
      
1.9 2.6 2.6 2.9 12.5 13.7 6.3 6.5 6.7 7.7 
Climax Molybdenum Co. Cmn N 3.3 
        
1.5 1.3 6.2 7.5 3.2 2.3 2.4 2.0 
Homestake Mining Cmn N 10.5 
  
33.8 19.5 11.5 8.2 8.2 1.0 1.0 0.7 
      
Public Utilities                                       
American Cities Power & Light Corp  3% ‘A’ Pref N 3.1 
      
1.4 1.4 1.8 2.0 4.3 1.8 4.5 4.2 4.3 5.5 
Commonwealth & Southern Corp 6% Pref Y 5.2 
  
4.1 4.3 3.2 6.2 6.3 6.8 5.3 5.6 
      Electric Power & Light Corp. 7% Pref Y 9.2 
     
4.9 11.9 8.0 2.8 4.3 12.9 10.5 16.1 16.5 4.1 
 Electric Power & Light Corp.  6% Pref Y 4.3 
 
4.2 1.7 0.3 4.3 9.2 8.1 4.7 2.5 3.9 
      United Corp.  Cmn Y 1.9 
 
1.3 
   
2.2 2.3 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.2 0.8 2.2 1.7 2.2 4.3 
United Corp.  3% Pref Y 2.4 
  
2.9 1.0 0.8 0.6 2.2 3.4 3.5 5.0 
      United Gas Corp.  7% Pref Y 11.9 
   
6.6 15.0 16.7 
 
6.8 11.9 14.7 
      
Railroads                                       
Baltimore & Ohio RR 5% 1st Bonds N 6.1 
       
1.6 2.3 3.2 10.5 11.1 6.2 6.3 6.5 7.0 
New York Chicago & St Louis RR 4.5% Ref’g C  N 3.0 
       
0.6 0.9 1.3 4.7 6.2 3.3 3.4 3.2 
 
Stocks with a contact   
 
44.8 79.4 40.1 32.2 23.6 38.2 58.7 46.0 49.2 43.1 49.5 45.7 42.5 41.8 45.3 37.7 43.9 
Stocks without a contact   
 
22.3 0.0 4.4 33.8 20.8 16.1 15.1 17.7 12.8 17.4 21.4 43.1 45.0 27.4 26.2 27.3 28.1 
Source: King’s College Archives and authors’ own calculations
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Table 4: Performance of US Security Holdings held by King’s College, Cambridge 
1930-45 
 
All figures are value-weighted buy-and-hold total returns including dividends for each 
calendar year ended December. US Market refers to the total return on common stocks 
represented by the Cowles Index. Excess is the difference between the total portfolio and 
the US market returns, Core refers to core holdings defined as securities held for at least 5 
years with a weighting in the total portfolio greater than 1%. S.D. is standard deviation 
and S.R. is the Sharpe ratio, defined as the excess return on the total portfolio over the risk 
free rate divided by the standard deviation of returns. 
 
% 
Total US Market Excess Common Preferred Bonds Core Non Core 
Dec 
1930 -37.1 -23.0 -14.1 -36.2 
  
  
1931 -51.0 -39.8 -11.2 -51.0 
 
 
-50.0 -52.1 
1932 28.7 -11.5 40.2 43.7 0.0 -46.5 44.6 -3.9 
1933 70.4 53 17.4 102.1 3.2 -14.8 8.7 105.0 
1934 26.2 -2.7 28.9 23.7 26.9 114.2 28.6 23.9 
1935 56.3 45.7 10.6 57.4 61.1 2.8 74.3 45.0 
1936 32.9 35.2 -2.3 18.8 40.6 32.8 46.9 13.9 
1937 -40.9 -30.8 -10.1 -40.2 -42.5 -13.6 -38.4 -47.0 
1938 17.1 21.5 -4.4 22.2 12.7 3.2 13.7 20.7 
1939 5.7 1.8 3.9 -6.7 14.7 7.0 7.6 2.7 
1940 -0.9 -9.6 8.7 -9.8 5.9 5.8 0.5 -3.5 
1941 -24.1 -10.2 -13.9 -11.0 -36.1 14.8 -15.7 -43.4 
1942 3.1 16.1 -13.0 54.7 -2.9 -31.1 7.6 -32.9 
1943 65.3 26.8 38.5 51.9 85.4 36.8 68.4 46.5 
1944 31.1 19.6 11.5 34.6 42.4 15.9 37.0 17.7 
1945 35.0 37.3 -2.3 81.1 37.7 -0.4 42.3 16.3 
Mean 13.6 8.1 5.5 21.0 17.8 9.1 18.4 7.3 
S.D. 37.2 27.9 18.1 44.2 34.8 37.7 35.7 41.5 
S.R. 0.36 0.29 0.30 0.47 0.51 0.24 0.52 0.17 
Source: King’s College Archive and authors’ calculations
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Figure 1: Keynes Purchases and Sales of US securities held by King’s 1929-46 
 
The bars indicate the net purchases and sales at a quarterly frequency in USD ‘000s. 
(left hand scale). The shaded grey area (right hand scale) indicates the level of the 
overall US Stock market represented by the Cowles (1938) Index. King’s College 
financial year end is August. 
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Figure 2: Relative Book-to-Market Ratio of US stocks held by King’s 1932-45 
We plot the distribution of relative book-to-market ratios of the stocks held by King’s at each calendar 
year end, where relative book-to-market is the book-to-market ratio of each stock expressed as a 
percentage of the book-to-market ratio of the overall market as described by the CRSP universe of US 
stocks (French, 2014). The shaded grey area shows the distribution of the relative book-to-market 
ratios between the 25th percentile (bottom) and 75th percentile (top). The black line represents the 
median relative book-to-market ratio. Investment Trust holdings are excluded. 
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